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ABSTRACT
A substantial body of literature connects media effects to consumer perceptions of the
criminal justice system. Research on the topic of cultivation theory has highlighted that
an increased fear of crime within the general populace, due to an exaggeration of
violence and criminal activity in the mass media, has spurred increased support for
punitive policing, harsher sentencing, and positive feelings toward capital punishment.
However, no research exists to explicate the cultivation of consumer perceptions toward
the criminal courts. This study examines the impact of media consumption through
television, the internet, and social media on consumer evaluations of the criminal courts.
Utilizing a national non-full probability sample of 500 White, Black, and Hispanic/Latino
respondents, the study examines media effects across race/ethnicity, as well as across
political party affiliation. Findings suggest that race/ethnicity and party affiliation
mediate the relationship between media consumption and evaluations toward the criminal
court system.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Mass media acts as an information repository for the vast majority of the
American populace. It informs the decision-making process and influences viewer
predilections toward issues and problems that are viewed as societally important. Media
notifies consumers about national and local crime, assists to incentivize criminal justice
policy, and helps to alleviate audience inexperience and anxiety by providing consistent
and familiar narratives that simplify even the most complicated, heinous, and
groundbreaking news stories (Altheide, 1997).
As an institution, the media assists to define contemporary social problems
(Altheide, 1997; Kitsuse & Spector, 1973) and frame policy measures related to those
issues so as to promote or reject critical government agendas (Baranauskas & Drakulich,
2018). Simply put, the mass media act to inform citizens toward the prevalence of violent
crime. As a result, consuming audiences garner opinions toward crime policies
subsequent of presented media messages (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
As that most individuals do not obtain firsthand knowledge toward crime or
criminal justice, mass media news outlets serve as essential sources for crime-related
information (Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, & Hough, 2003; Surette, 2015). Resultant of
this knowledge-buffering effect, consumer overestimations of crime prevalence are
common and even influence substantial life decisions such as where one chooses to live
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and work (Rader, May, & Goodrum, 2007). Moreover, scholars contend that crimerelated media coverage affects public understanding and interest toward punitive crime
policies, which includes an increased support for the death penalty (Britto & NogaStyron, 2014; Enns, 2016; Holbert, Shah, & Kwak, 2004; Kort-Butler & Sittner
Hartshorn, 2011).
Not all media messages are created the same, however. Within the realm of
contemporary research, scholars argue that mass media organizations differ in their
approach to criminality. Increasing political polarization has culminated into differing
media habits (Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Eva Matsa, 2014), and research shows that
media organizations alter presentations of criminality and social policy based on their
ideological platform (Mitchell, et al., 2014). Predictably, media platforms which host a
conservative audience may explicate the need to curb criminality through increased
punitiveness, while progressive media organizations may present crime-related content in
a way which incentivizes rehabilitation and policy reform (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).
Consequently, research highlights the importance of examining the effects of
media messages. Scholarship in the field contests that the effects of media presentations
are profound and contain aspects of an homogenizing nature (Iyengar, 1991; Surette,
2007). Public understanding of social issues including crime control, social policy,
legislative reform, and the criminal justice system generally, are affected by
sensationalized media with effects most often detrimental to historically vulnerable
minority groups (Alexander, 2010; Entman, 1992; Dotter, 2003; Blackman, 2014).
Scholarship within the field of media studies has become quite vast and has
explicated numerous outcomes of crime-related media presentations including confidence
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in the police, consumer perceptions of minorities, immigration, attitudes toward police
and policing, estimations of crime, the penal system, and favorability toward punitive
crime policies. Though substantial research has provided analysis on the topic of media,
it appears that consumer perceptions toward the criminal courts remains a generally
unknown variable within the realm of cultivation. This study will add to cultivation
literature by addressing media influence in relation to the judicial system in an attempt to
solicit whether media’s exhaustive reach (Iyengar, 1991) and problem-creating
presentation styles (Altheide, 1997) alter a viewing audience’s favorability toward the
criminal courts.
The reasons to explore this potential phenomenon are many. Imperatively, it
appears that within the context of contemporary problems, ideals of justice are being
brought to the mainstream symbolic environment. Criminal justice and its many
subsequent facets face scrutiny as questions concerning the penal system, criminal
impartiality, racial tensions, and a plethora of other justiciable matters continue to be
presented in media platforms which highlight issues related to civil liberties and the
legitimacy of the American court system.
As well, a substantial body of research has shown that the mass media have been
seemingly proactive to culminate derision within society; utilizing the tool that is
pervasive influence to polarize, subjugate, and denigrate minority groups through
increased presentations of minority criminal activity and brutality. Historically, televised
media has acted as a mechanism for congressional lobby, influencing senators such as Joe
Biden and others to vote for Reagan era discriminatory drug policies (Chin, 2002). It
seems that only with the introduction of democratic, non-centralized, and independent
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media platforms coined as social media, that more prominent and compelling examples
of police discrimination have flourished, prompting questions of social, racial, and
political justice and the intentions of traditional mass media venues.
Within the complexity that is media influence and academic discussion, the
judicial system seems to be a particularly salient topic to be explored within the realm of
media studies, as that to date, it appears no scholarship exists to explicate statistical
insights between consumer favorability toward the criminal courts and the cultivation
hypothesis as a theoretical framework. Furthermore, what little scholarship that does exist
between media and the courts highlights an alarming imperative to research this
phenomenon, asserting that if the “media continue on their current path toward greater
sensationalism, derogating judges, highlighting political decision making, and
emphasizing the bitterly partisan and ideological nature of the confirmation process, then
we should expect deleterious consequences for [public] opinion [of the court system]”
(Johnston & Bartels, 2010, p. 276). Certainly, under such pressurizing conditions,
negative public opinion “could lead to support for more fundamental changes to these
institutions,” (p. 276).
Surely, the denigration of the penal system has been long substantiated within
American media presentations. Highly sensational, entertaining, and negatively oriented
news stories continue to flourish within conventional media platforms. Such rampant
volatility within mainstream media, where prominent news figures participate in
antagonistic and polarizing argument, has shown to decrease trust and support for
opposing viewpoints and delegitimize the decisions of judicial officials (Mutz, 2007).
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More alarmingly, scholars contend that crime-related media pins the procedures
of the judicial system against effective and punitive criminal justice (Doyle, 2006;
Eschholz, Blackwell, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2002; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003),
wherein ruthless criminals, murderers, and sexual deviants are provided safe haven
behind the lethargic nature of due process and individual civil liberties (Beckett &
Sasson, 2004). Indeed, public support for the radical alteration of an incompetent judicial
system is predictable under these pretenses, especially as that sensationalist and negative
viewpoints of case decisions are most common among popularly consumed media
organizations. However, in contrast to mainstream media reporting, official televised
media coverage of court proceedings is usually of poor quality and low entertainment
value, and often includes television reporters who confound court rulings resulting in
decreased viewership (Slotnick & Segal, 1998).
Given the myriad of issues which obfuscate societal knowledge of the criminal
justice system, it seems pressing to gain awareness of the degree to which mass media
presentations alter consumer favorability toward the criminal court system. Have the
long-recognized issues associated with sensationalist portrayals of criminal justice
distorted consumer perceptions of the court’s legitimacy? Are the criminal courts
perceived as a barrier to effective and punitive policing in relation to media presentations
that emphasize corruption among judicial officials, lethargy within the penal system, and
an overall disgust for the doctrine of civil liberties? This study confronts these complex
questions by examining how media exposure influences consumer evaluations toward the
criminal courts. Analyzing a non-full probability sample that includes an oversampling of
minority respondents, the study suggests that exposure to traditional and new-age media
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platforms has subsequent effects on consumer evaluations toward the courts. Specifically,
when the population sample is split across race/ethnicity and political party affiliation,
analyses establish that a relationship exists between media exposure and favorability
toward the criminal courts among respondents.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Theoretical framework
To begin, it is important to address how—and why—mass media organizations
stylize, format, and present crime-related content. Moreover, it is necessary to explicate
how these institutions commodify seemingly random criminal events into consistent and
repetitive narratives that blend into their existing ideological prefect. Most importantly,
insights toward the resulting consequences of these stylistic and ideological narrative
approaches must be fleshed out in order to appropriately predict the potentially
deleterious ramifications which media presentations may have on perceptions toward the
court system. To appropriately investigate the effects resultant of media consumption,
this study begins with the articulation of its theoretical framework: the cultivation
hypothesis and subsequent associated theory.
As surmised by Gerbner and Gross (1976), the cultivation hypothesis provides
that the mass media play a pivotal role to influence the perceptions and beliefs of a
viewing populace. They contend that media programming alters a consumer’s
understanding of the world around them. In contrast to reality, consumers view the world
through an artificial lens, thereby accepting truth as displayed through mass media
presentations. The researchers argued that mass media productions foster a ‘mean-world
perspective’ due to the graphic and violent nature of televised productions wherein
consumers believe the world to be a much more violent and scary place than it is in
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actuality. Gerbner, Eleey, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, and Signorielli (1977)
hypothesized that increased consumption of violent depictions will lead media consumers
to culminate a fear and distrust toward others.
Furthering their predictions, Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1980)
argued that the cultivation of viewer perceptions is continually reinforced through a
mechanism known as resonance. Researchers defined resonance as an increased appeal of
media content by specific audiences which are targeted through media representations of
televised material that reflect established consumer predilections. Gerbner’s cohort
(1980) further argued that resonance acts as a moderator between the individual and
televised content selection. Continued viewer consumption of a particular media platform
requires the audience to maintain an approved predilection toward the media source;
continued consumer preference toward a particular media institution requires that the
program include notions of salience, perceived credibility, and trustworthiness (Benford
& Snow, 2000).
Moreover, Gerbner and associates (1976; 1980) hypothesized that cultivation
occurs passively within the individual; that is, an individual consumes media content and
cultivation subsequently occurs. Contemporary scholarship contests that media utilizes a
more nuanced approach toward the alteration of consumer preferences, however. Current
notions toward resonance and cultivation generally include two primary dimensions:
“audience characteristics and message-specific influences on the cultivation of viewers’
attitudes and beliefs” (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011, p. 170). The process of cultivation
is not passive, but rather occurs through complex and subtle psychological processes
within the individual who consumes, evaluates, and stores information (Coenen & Van
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den Bulck, 2016). Removed from the notions of passive indoctrination, scholars
recognize the importance of measuring intricate and convening factors within cultivation
studies: analyses of consumer perceptions must include “the characteristics of the
message, of the audience, and of the dependent measure” (Heath & Gilbert, 1996, p.
384).
To explicate the overarching effect of mass media productions, Gerbner and
associates (1980; 1998) hypothesized that televised media content alters the universal
perceptions of society. Coined as the mainstream, Gerbner’s cohort (1980) argued that
media content manipulates the dominant and overarching force of ethics within a society;
they contend that mass media productions are “the source of the most broadly-shared
images and messages in history. It is the mainstream of the common symbolic
environment into which our children are born and in which we all live out our lives” (p.
177). The researchers ascertained that mass media is the primary source of entertainment
and information within one’s community; thusly, media content may have profound and
homogenizing affects upon a consuming audience.
Commodification of the media message
While the cultivation hypothesis broadly explains how consumer predilections are
influenced, the process to do so is reasoned to be much more detailed. While trust and
viewer preferences are imperative for successful message influence, scholars contest that
success to garner these critical aspects is highly nuanced and multi-faceted. In order to
maintain perceptions of official legitimacy, traditional media organizations which display
media content present to their audiences an environment that is seen as highly refined,
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elite, and sterile; such an atmosphere subsequently connotes a sense of truth and
professionality onto the consumer (Altheide, 1997).
Then, media organizations use formats to assist the legitimacy of their message.
Formats assist to increase organizational trustworthiness and apply a general definition of
media content presented, allowing viewers to recognize the presentation as ideologically
familiar (Altheide, 1985). As defined, formats relay a conceptual understanding to an
organization’s viewership and imply how a consuming audience should approach the
problem presented. In short, formats assist to manipulate audience assumptions and
perceptions toward a problem or issue (Meyrowitz, 1985; Schlesinger, Murdock, &
Elliott, 1983) and aid in the storytelling process (Beale, 2006).
While formats are necessary to create familiarity and understanding among a
presentation’s audience, commodification further describes the manipulation of the
presented crime narrative. Defined as “the packaging and marketing of crime information
for popular consumption” (Beale, 2006, p. 429), ‘commodification’ assists in the
legitimacy of televised media presentations. The frequency of crime-related stories is
related to the ease in which each crime narrative is commodified; because of this, crimerelated news stories present highly entertaining and episodic narratives which entail
dramatic events between individuals (Bandes, 2004).
Subsequent of commodification and formatting, a media programme’s ability to
set public agenda seems natural and unassuming. The term agenda setting, is the process
in which media presentations guide a consuming audience’s attention to issues deemed
critical by the organization (Perse, 2001). With an agenda firmly set, media organizations
then influence viewer predilections toward a specific issue through continual impression,
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thereby altering or reinforcing individual consideration toward the problem; a subsequent
method of the agenda setting process known as priming (Paletz, 2002). “When combined,
[agenda setting and priming] show that the media’s emphasis on crime makes the issue
more salient in the minds of viewers[…]which causes the public to perceive crime as a
more severe problem than real world figures indicate” (Beale, 2006, p. 442). The effects
of agenda setting are most successful when individual consumers lack experience with an
issue perceived as salient through the media lens (Altheide, 1997; Callanan &
Rosenberger, 2011; Perse, 2001).
Tailoring the crime narrative to the media production outlet subsequent of
priming and formatting provides comfort and consistency to an audience through
repetition, familiarity, and a sense of the professional environment. However, the
commodification process must be further supplemented to increase sensationalism and
draw increased viewership. Within this process, mass media organizations stylize,
package, and distribute crime-related stories through a method defined as the framing of
the media message (Altheide, 1997).
Frames are utilized in order to create highly entertaining narratives which
incorporate aspects of realism, ultimately leading to the influence of viewer
interpretations of a problem and assumptions of truth. Problems presented to a consumer
base are filtered through stylizing frames which indicate to the audience “what will be
discussed, how it will be discussed, and above all, how it will not be discussed,”
(Altheide, 1997, p. 651). Frames determine how problems are presented to an audience
and assist to present a highly complex issue as a simplified, episodic, and thematic story
with a precise problem and solution (Iyengar, 1991). Crime stories filtered through
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frames are subsequently stripped of their complexities and are presented as simplistic,
therefore becoming easily interpreted information (Altheide, 1997). The act of framing is
to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p.
52).
The problem frame
Antiquated into cultivation discourse, the problem frame as theorized by Altheide
(1997), is a specific type of framing process which assists media organizations to
distribute a simplified narrative of crime that includes the deposition of a heinous act with
little context, classifies the perpetrator in derogatory terms, and promotes immediate and
punitive justice to the issue. Solutions to heinous criminal activity are most commonly
accomplished through demands for increased crime policies and a lessening of
protections provided by procedural due process (Altheide, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000;
Entman, 1992; Iyengar, 1991). The problem frame simplifies complicated information
into a tale of brutality, wherein stories are tailored to provide an easily understandable
narrative which includes fictional storytelling aspects coupled with indiscriminate
violence (Surette, 2015).
Stories mediated through the problem frame commonly entail egregious actions
which are antithetical toward societal morals and ethics, resulting in universal decry and a
demand for punitive solutions “that are presumably familiar and uncontested” (Altheide,
1997, p. 654). The purpose of the problem frame is to “produce a discourse of fear that
then becomes a ‘resource’ for the audience to draw on when interpreting subsequent
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reports” (p. 655). As a result, media crime reports include elements of action and
extraordinary circumstances (Snow, 1983), with a beginning that explains the occurrence
of the crime, a middle which describes how the story continues to manifest, and an end
that includes a detailed synopsis of predictable punitive solutions carried out toward the
perpetrator (Altheide, 1997).
Overrepresentation of crime-related media content through the problem frame
distorts viewer understanding of real-world crime occurrences and influences consumer
perceptions toward a belief that the world is more brutal and dangerous than it actually is
(Beale, 2006; Drakulich, 2012; Drakulich & Siller, 2015; Gerbner et al.,1980). The
problem frame presents crime as indiscriminate among societal members (Surette, 2015)
and that American life is fearful and perilous (Signorielli, Gerbner, & Morgan, 1995;
Signorielli & Gerbner, 1988). Given that mass media organizations undeniably “play a
large role in shaping public agendas by influencing what people think about” (Altheide,
1997, p. 648), it is of no surprise that frequent use of the problem frame obscures
consumer perceptions toward complicated issues in the context of society.
Mass media programming and the cultivation hypothesis
In their progenitor work, Gerbner and Gross (1976) hypothesized that media
portrayals of crime and violence cultivate a mean-world perspective which consequently
produces distrust and fear of others within a program’s viewing audience. The scholars
did not distinguish between fiction and nonfiction crime and violence portrayals, arguing
that presentations of excessive violence and brutality within mass media productions are
generally effective to cultivate fear within an audience. Subsequent research substantiates
these claims, progressing that violence presented in fictional entertainment content has
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similar affects to nonfictional crime productions (Vergeer, Rutten, & Scheepers, 1996;
Vergeer & Scheepers, 1998). Lichter, Lichter, and Rothman (1994) and RhinebergerDunn, Rader, and Williams (2008) provide similar conclusions wherein their research
showed that fictional crime-related television productions attribute to an increased fear
and distrust within a consuming populace.
However, cultivation effects of fictional media entertainment have undergone
extensive trepidation as other notable works propose that notions of perceived realism are
required for the successful alteration of a viewer’s preferences toward an issue (Potter,
1986; Surette, 2007). Similarly, other literature purports that crime-related fictional
entertainment lacks correlation when socio-demographic factors are placed within an
empirical work (Doob & MacDonald, 1979). Eschholz (1997, p. 45) reported that “no
relationship between the viewing of drama programs and fear of crime [existed]” within
her studies when controlling for demographic variables, and that “drama programming
may actually reduce fear” (pp. 45-46). The scholar subsequently contended that crime
fiction entertainment may only be successful in the cultivation of low experience
consumers, providing that “[viewers] may substitute the victimization of individuals on
[fictional] television for their own low actual victimization risks” (p. 46).
Communication scholarship contests contrarily to these findings, arguing that
“nonfiction limits the narrative experience that is needed [for cultivation to occur]”
(Coenen & Van den Bulck, 2016, p. 433), and that fictional entertainment is more
successful to cultivate viewer perceptions due to nonfictional programming being “less
transporting than fictional narratives[…]less [associated with] character identification,
and only [providing] limited parasocial interactions” (p. 433). Similarly, Moyer-Gusé and
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Nabi (2010) contend that nonfiction viewers are more likely than consumers of crime
fiction to experience psychological resistance to an implied message, thereby suggesting
nonfiction crime media to be less persuasive than its fictional counterpart. Dvir-Gvirsman
(2015) suggests that nonfiction crime media is successful in its cultivation efforts, but
only when resonance acts as a mediator between media content and the viewer; that is,
media influence occurs when consumers hold opinions that are in line with the implied
message prior to media exposure.
Other literature suggests that the disjointed nature of crime-related fictional
entertainment may be due, in part, to the ways in which media frames and produces
fictionalized crime. With increasing regularity, crime fiction is produced and stylized
from non-fiction criminal acts. Known as the ‘ripped from the headlines approach’
(Britto, Hughes, Saltzman, & Stroh, 2007), media productions create sensational and
realistic fictional entertainment that is centered upon nonfiction crime stories. This style
of story framing may obscure consumer ability to distinguish reality from crime fiction
(Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011), thus producing successful cultivation parameters within
a viewing audience.
As interestingly, it appears that crime-related media may generally be more
relevant to consumers who perceive themselves to live in neighborhoods of high crime
and/or high ethnic variance (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003). Defined as the ‘social
threat approach,’ scholars contend that “racial composition of place” (Chiricos, McEntire,
& Gertz, 2001, p. 323) plays an important role toward an individual’s fear level of crime
(Blalock, 1967). Similarly, social threat research posits that there is a link between
individual level understanding of nearby criminal danger and a reinforcement of the
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perceived threat through crime-related media programming (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz,
2003). Eschholz (1997) reported comparably, stating that “individuals who live in highcrime areas may be particularly sensitive to crime on television because of their direct
knowledge of a crime problem in their neighborhoods” (p. 47). Quillian and Pager (2001)
further this proclamation, finding that residents living in ethnically heterogenic
neighborhoods perceive there to be increased levels of crime when viewing crime-related
media.
New-age media and the cultivation hypothesis
Though research emphases have been placed upon traditional media programming
such as television, print media, and radio as primary contributors to cultivation effects,
scholars recognize these venues of media consumption have declined in viewership
significantly in recent years as global information technologies have become a proliferate
source of media consumption and personal connectedness (Mitchell & Holcomb, 2016).
Theoretical scholarly approaches to the internet and social media platforms contend that
these derivatives may act as clones to their traditional media counterparts, dispensing
crime-related information and producing an increased fear of crime (Graber, 1996).
Empirical research disputes these predictions however, as contemporary scholarship has
suggested that internet media users obtain high discretion as to what they consume
through internet media platforms and as to how they consume it (Kim, 2008; Rainie,
2010). Research further highlights differences in the way consumers utilize internet
media in contrast to traditional media sources, wherein internet consumers have more
control to solicit the information which they find relevant while dismissing information
unassociated with their immediate intentions (Krimsky, 2007; Mythen, 2010).
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Roche, Pickett, and Gertz (2016) similarly find little support for the cultivation
hypothesis in the context of internet crime-related media consumption. When researchers
surveyed nearly 14,000 participants toward punitive attitudes, victimization, and death
penalty favorability, their results “[found] little consistent evidence that Internet news
consumption is associated with views about crime and justice,” (p. 226) because “online
news content may be less regulated, can be supplemented with an array of additional
information sources, and allows for increased user agency” (p. 216). While Roche,
Pickett, and Gertz’s (2016, p. 231) most important finding was that their “results
[provided] no evidence that Internet news consumption is positively associated with
anxiety about crime, or support for getting tough with criminals,” others contend that
cultivation of consumer perceptions within new-age media is indeed occurring.
Recognizing that “trends in news consumption have[…]shown dramatic changes
over the past two decades,” Intravia, Wollf, and Piquero (2018, p. 966) utilized a dataset
that included the survey responses of nearly 250 undergraduate students from a large
midwestern university. Measuring for attitudes toward police legitimacy, the cohort
tested the dependent variable against multiple venues of media exposure including social
media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instragram. In the study’s bivariate
measure (Spearman’s Rho), researchers found marginal support for social media
applications, and in the study’s disaggregated ordinary least squared regression (sex, race,
prior contact to law enforcement), the consumption of social media was once again found
to be “marginally associated with positive attitudes toward police legitimacy” (p. 974).
While neither study is conclusive, these research efforts firmly impress the need
to include new-age media platforms within subsequent cultivation research. As
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importantly, new-age media use continues to flourish among U.S. citizens, and is
especially prevalent among minorities. In a study recently released by the Nielson Report
(2020, p. 10), it was found that Latinos “are 57% more likely to use social media as a
primary source of information” over traditional news programming and that recent social
media usage has increased 71% in the Latino population. The Pew Research Center
(2018) concluded similarly, finding that “three-quarters of U.S. Latinos get their news
from internet sources[…]including social media” on a typical weekday. Indeed, mobile
platform use for news consumption has drastically increased in recent years for minority
members. Insights are similarly comparable for the United States as a whole, wherein the
“majority of U.S. adults (82%) get news online” (Pew Research Center, 2014)
Moreover, as cultivation continues forward into a more contemporary nature, it is
imperative that new-age media variables overcome traditional antiquated limitations.
Intravia, Wolff, and Piquero (2018) recognize that questions related to social media
consumption only included “overall time spent consuming the various media platforms”
(p. 976) which may have been cause for their meager findings. In direct relation to social
media consumption, future research must ask “respondents specific content-related
questions regarding media usage (i.e., how much respondents are exposed to stories and
news reports about policing)” (p. 977).
Media presentations of crime and violence
Where scholarship toward the internet and new-age media cast uncertainty upon
cultivation effects and crime-related content, research of traditional media programming
firmly identifies the not-so-inconsequential outcomes of media crime presentations. This
is largely due to the prevalence of crime presentations throughout traditional media
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sources. In fact, crime is the most widely presented media content in the United States,
and it is the most common leading story on news broadcasts (Klite, Bardwell, &
Saltzman, 1997). Crime stories are the most preferred topics by news and local media
providers (Jewkes, 2015; Reiner, 2002; Surette, 2015), with violent crime and homicide
constituting disproportionate airtime when compared to other criminal activities (Britto,
et al., 2007; Eschholz, Mallard, & Flynn, 2004). News media stories frequently depict
violent crime as a random act (Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997), occurring most
commonly among strangers (Beale, 2006; Britto, et al., 2007), wherein offenders are
deemed ruthless and capable to harm anyone (Surette, 2015).
Though crime-related content has always been a substantial contributor to news
media presentations within the United States, such expansive coverage of criminality
became even more proliferate throughout media productions in order to maintain
consumer interests and bolster diminishing revenue in the oncoming wave of information
technology (Altheide, 1997; Beale, 2006; Dotter, 2003; Dowler, 2003). In agreement,
other scholars have contended that in order to compete with fictional entertainment
media, televised news media has subsequently become highly sensationalized (Chermak,
1994; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). As a result, crime-related news caters toward
sensationalist, dramatic, and extraordinary stories filled with entertainment value and
suspense (Britto, et al., 2007). Unsurprisingly then, crime-related media outcompetes all
other news media content (Beale, 2006), and in similar relation to local news sources,
national and popular news entities such as ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, and FOX news media
outlets devote the majority of airtime to issues related to justice, criminality, and
punitiveness (Beale, 2006; Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011).
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Other research further explicates the ubiquitous nature of crime-related mass
media content, finding that “media conglomerates that own television networks have
been able to capture two-thirds of the primetime viewing audience (Callanan &
Rosenberger, 2011, p. 185). This is due to the monopolized media market, wherein a
small number of elite corporations own the majority of cable television channels (Cooper,
2005). The subsequent conglomeration of media venues “has led to a lack of diversity in
media content and an overreliance on violence as a focal point for much of the
programming created” (Rosenberger & Dierenfeldt, 2020, p. 5). Though there are more
selections of media content than have ever previously existed, ubiquitous audience
intended messages related to criminality are presented across all consumer audiences
(Gerbner, et al., 1980).
Media presentations of minority members
Indeed, crime and violence saturate mainstream televised media (Gerbner &
Gross, 1976), and while media presentations of crime do not necessarily contain the
likeness of a minority perpetrator or include minority suspect representation
disproportionately when compared to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Entman, 1992;
Eschholz, 1998), “when violent crimes, robbery, or felonies are the focus, Black suspects
are shown in disproportionate numbers” (Eschholz, Mallard, & Flynn, 2004, p. 165).
Though researchers have found that minority crime offending is not excessively
represented in relation to real world figures (Chermak 1995; Entman, 1992), a study
conducted by Eschholz, Chiricos, and Weitzel (1998) proffered that 69% of survey
respondents believed that Blacks were more frequently shown as perpetrators than
Whites on televised programming. Despite having equitable, and perhaps meager
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criminal representation in crime-related media, Blacks are disproportionately and most
commonly viewed as dangerous criminals in society (Eschholz, Mallard, & Flynn, 2004).
To more appropriately explain this problem, scholars defined the phenomenon as
‘racial typification’ (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002), an issue subsequent of crime media
representations which implies that the common occurrences of crime are subsequent of
ethnic minorities. The framing of media stories contributes a critical role toward this
phenomenon as well: when compared to official statistics, Dixon and Linz (2000) found
that crime-related news media commonly overrepresented Blacks as lawbreakers in
relation to Whites and Latinos. This is particularly salient for violent crimes, wherein
Black suspects are most frequently represented as criminals rather than defendants
(Entman 1990; Entman, 1992). However, scholars have contrarily found that compared to
official statistics, Blacks are overwhelmingly underrepresented toward their involvement
in nonviolent crimes (Gilliam, et al., 1996), which suggests to viewers that Blacks are
perpetrators of violent crime.
Though crime-related media does not overrepresent the depiction of Black men as
criminal offenders, news media depictions of crime commonly associate that young
Black males and crime are inexorably linked (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004; Entman &
Rojecki, 2000). In fact, Black males make up the majority of criminal presentations of
any other minority member in news media (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002). Likewise, when
compared to other minority groups, news media programming disproportionately portrays
Blacks in threatening contexts which connote criminality and violence (Entman, 1990;
1992; Entman & Rojecki, 2000).
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In regard to the portrayal of Black suspects in crime-related news media, Entman
(1992) and Entman and Rojecki (2000) assert that Black suspects are most commonly
presented with a threatening facial expression and posture, dressed in clothing that
implies low socioeconomic status, displayed with alleged crimes highlighted in
derogatory terms, and portrayed with an exaggerated emphasis toward their continued
resistance to law enforcement. Similarly, Blackman (2014) finds that compared to White
perpetrators, presentations of Black criminals imply an incongruence with societal
expectations and that something should be done about the committed criminal act. In
contrast to Whites, Black suspect presentations most commonly include a ‘guilty until
proven innocent’ connotation (Entman & Rojecki, 2000).
Empirical work on the topic of race and crime contends that “racialized portrayals
of crime may be particularly salient for White media consumers who live in areas with
larger African American populations” (Baranauskas & Drakulich, 2018, p. 684).
Eschholz and her cohort (2003) contend similarly, arguing that a perceived social threat
may affect salience toward racialized media programming. Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, and
Davies (2004) report parallel findings, stating that ethnic variance in neighborhood
compositions acts as a tuning device for White media consumers. Indeed, Black suspect
portrayals within media presentations influence where members of the prevailing
majority choose to live and work (Rader, May, & Goodrum, 2007), ensuring continued
segregation and fear among racial affiliations.
It is clear that Black suspect representation in the media has led to fear and
distrust in the African American population (Entman, 1990; Entman, 1992; Eschholz,
Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1980). Racial
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typification has consequently muddled societal understandings of crime frequency and
criminal brutality, leading to rampant overestimations of crime occurrence and
prevalence of heinous violence (Baranauskas & Drakulich, 2018; Dotter, 2003; Gerbner
et al., 1977). These issues have subsequently flooded into the political arena, prompting
support for substantial punitive measures (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004), often with
lasting effects, that have been intentionally orchestrated to curb minority criminality.
Indeed, the American mainstream media has inextricably conjoined race and crime,
marring social and political landscapes so feverishly that “today’s prevailing criminal
predator has become a euphemism for young black male” (Barak, 1994, p. 137, see
Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004, p. 363).
Media presentations of the criminal justice system
Along with the myriad issues associated with media portrayal of minority
perpetrators, presentations of heroism and righteousness have further convoluted societal
understanding of the criminal justice system in its entirety. Ordinarily, media productions
represent aspects of the criminal justice system in a manner which highlights effective
pursuit of criminal syndicates through punitive and excessive force (Doyle, 1998). This is
especially common for media representations of police officers, wherein righteous public
servants are impeded by procedural due process and must subsequently overcome the
barriers of civil rights in order to bring justice to a morally impetuous perpetrator
(Eschholz, Blackwell, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2002; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003).
These public servants are usually valorized as hardworking and morally credible
individuals at constant odds with aspects of the criminal justice system (Eschholz,
Mallard, & Flynn, 2004). Excessive force and punitive criminal policy are the usual

24
marketed explications toward effective policing (Doyle, 2006). With little deviation,
punitive police officers and reduced judicial barriers usually culminate in catching the
villain (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003).
Contrary to the glamorized portrayals of law enforcement officials, the courts are
commonly depicted to be at odds with noble criminal detectives, often depicted as
lethargic and incompetent vestigial appendages of the criminal justice system
(Baranauskas & Drakulich, 2018; Beckett & Sasson, 2004). While unrestrained police
members are presented as the most effective tool to curb brutal criminality, the judicial
system is often viewed as an ineffective, often corrupt, and flawed organization that
provides undeserving leniency to ruthless criminals through the unnecessary loopholes
that are civil liberties (Jewkes, 2015). Media presentations most commonly depict
excessive punitiveness as the answer to criminality (Rhineberger-Dunn, Rader, &
Williams, 2008), while judges and the court system stand in opposition to virtuous justice
(Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003).
Media effects toward crime policies
Naturally then, it seems mass media presentations of crime, violence, and
minority groups have gravitated toward punitive policy preference with increasing viewer
support. Ample scholarly work contends that crime-related media presentations affect
criminal policy understanding and interests. More concerning is the reality in which
criminal policies have become increasingly more punitive due to the increased salience of
crime (Garland, 2001), further energized through racial typification subsequent of media
presentations (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004); that is to say, the media depict crime as
an important topic to be discussed (Altheide, 1997; Entman, 1992; 1993) and, that it is a
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symptom of Black men (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002; Entman, 1993; Chiricos, Welch, &
Gertz, 2004)
Indeed, the frequency of crime-related narratives in the mass media assists
consuming audiences to shape understandings of crime prevalence and thus draw
preferences toward criminal justice policies (Beale, 2006; Baranauskas & Drakulich,
2018; Drakulich, 2013; Surette, 2015). Such a distorted reality produced from crimerelated content affirms societal conceptualizations of criminality and purports a need to
curb criminal intent through increased punitive crime policies (Altheide, 1997; Altheide
& Snow, 1991; Goffman, 1974; Iyengar, 1991; Snow, 1983). Other literature asserts
similarly, wherein researchers suggest that crime-reality programming may impact
individual policy understanding and opinions about the criminal justice system which
may subsequently bring about support toward punitiveness (Holbrook & Hill, 2005;
Iyengar, 1991). Dotter (2003) furthers this proclamation, claiming that policy advocacy
from crime-related media content has resulted in tailored police practices, racist punitive
crime legislation, and increased incarceration of minority members.
Moreover, crime-related media increasingly caters to politically charged rhetoric,
furthering assertions that criminal justice and crime are political issues related to party
affiliation (Gilliam, Iyengar, Simon, & Wright, 1996; Jewkes, 2015). Relative to the
politicized nature of crime, scholarship contends that increased media attention which
depicted Black America as a drug-den fueled tough-on-crime justice policies that affected
Black communities directly and exclusively (Gordon, 1994). Others claim similarly,
asserting that media representation of Black drug use influenced the White community to
uptake interests toward punitive crime policies with increasing frequency (Chin, 2002),

26
and that Black deviance as depicted through mass media venues rallied intense support
toward extremely punitive crime policies such as 3-strike-laws, minimum mandatory
sentencing for drug crimes, and propositions toward life imprisonment for drug
distribution (Alexander, 2010).
Media effects toward the court system
Subsequent of these findings, it appears that sensationalized media incite society’s
most punitive interests through an exaggeration of criminal brutality and crime
prevalence. In turn, this has led to an increasingly harsh criminal justice system.
However, the need to prevent heinous criminal acts through increased support for
punitive policies is not the only aspect of the criminal justice system to bring about such
effects consequent the media lens. The judicial system too, has undergone extensive
sensationalist rhetoric, resulting in coerced court decisions and a reduction in the validity
of objective impartiality and the doctrine of civil liberties (Oswald, 1994).
Of the judiciary, the trial courts have been the most notable example of media
attention and ensuing consequential outcomes (Oswald, 1994). The judge as an official
position, has historically enjoyed the pleasure of being perceived by society as an almost
mythic role within the criminal justice sphere (Johnston & Bartels, 2010), antiquated into
society’s legal understanding as objective and impartial. However, with the introduction
of the media in high profile cases, this perception has waned. Contemporary media
sources, such as news entertainment talk shows and political radio are far “more
concerned with entertainment value than restrained reporting” (Johnston & Bartels, 2010,
p. 263). Given the nature of sensationalist rhetoric, perceived negative aspects of the
judicial system have been brought into the mainstream environment wherein assessments
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of objective impartiality have been replaced with skepticism toward “the political nature
of judicial decision making” (p. 263).
More problematic are the tendencies for judicial decisions to be influenced by
negative media reports. In controversial cases that elicit emotional responses from
community and political members, increased media scrutiny may erode the validity of a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by a jury of their impartial peers
(Oswald, 1994). Subsequent of consistent rhetoric that may “provide the public with a
case different from the courtroom version [through presentations] of the evidence in a
biased fashion or stressing the sensational aspects of the case” (Oswald, 1994, p. 405),
the defendant’s constitutional guarantee to a fair trial is abundantly less likely, given that
an unpopular verdict could incite riots (Koon & Dietz, 1992). Consequentially, it seems
the media have created a self-fulfilling perversion of the judicial system: the nature of the
courts is conveyed as political and biased through the media lens; in turn, judicial
decisions are forced to become political and biased in order to maintain citizen approval
and legitimacy. In an effort to avoid the diminishing of its validity through
sensationalized scrutiny, the court system effectively diminishes itself through the
discontinuity of civil liberties.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, sensationalized rhetoric appears to weaken the validity of
court decisions. In a study conducted by Johnston and Bartels (2010), it was found that
“higher levels of exposure to sensationalist[…]media sources predict more negative
attitudes toward the court” (p. 273). Utilizing two separate nationally representative
datasets, the researchers tested consumer favorability toward the court system against
sensationalized media exposure in a linear regression model. Far from banal, the findings
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suggested that individuals who consume sensationalized stories about the courts were less
favorable toward judicial decisions. Such a finding implies that “the declining long-term
support [of the legal system] leaves the courts on shaky grounds in terms of their
protection from fundamental alterations in the face of negatively viewed decisions” (p.
277). As that the court system possesses neither the power to appropriate nor sanction, it
relies on the approval of the people to maintain legitimacy and enact policy. Thus, in the
face of continued negative media attention, the validity of case decisions and the
implementation of policy may see increased trepidation in future court proceedings
(Rosenberg, 1991).
Justification for current study
Given that research which explicates media effects toward crime, minority
representations, and policy understanding and support exist to such ample degree, it is
surprising that little empirical work has been produced in an effort to understand media
effects toward the courts. Though the criminal justice system has been investigated
exhaustively, it appears that few other works exist to provide a robust demonstration of
consumer perceptions toward the criminal court system. This study aims to address this
gap. In an effort to further understand how the mass media affect viewer predilections,
our research will attempt to bridge the chasm between media presentations of criminal
justice and outcomes of favorability toward the courts.
While research provided within the literature review highlights the importance of
race/ethnicity and media consumption to establish cultivation effects, these factors have
only been utilized within a limited scope. This empirical work attempts to overcome two
concerning limitations within previous cultivation research. First, this study employs data
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that includes an oversample of Black and Hispanic/Latino respondents which will allow
for a stronger comparison across race/ethnicity. Recent studies have presented
compelling evidence that cultivation effects within minority members must be
reconsidered; however, due to data limitations the prospective phenomenon of minority
cultivation is widely debated.
Eschholz and associated (2002) have argued that Black consumer opinions of the
criminal justice system may be so poor that media presentations would do little to
persuade this consuming demographic (i.e., ‘the floor hypothesis’), and that subsequent
testing of racial demographics in relation to cultivation may result in similar findings.
Unequivocally, Callanan and Rosenberger (2011) found that no relationship existed
between any media variable and Black or Hispanic confidence in law enforcement when
a series of ordinary least squared regressions were disaggregated by race/ethnicity in a
study which included a nationally representative sample of more than 3000 survey
responses. However, recent scholarship confirms the importance of controlling for the
socio-demographic factors of respondents; failure to do so may result in the
overestimation of media effects (Callanan, 2012; Callanan & Rosenberger, 2015;
Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997). In any case, scholars have heightened the imperative
for studies which include the influence of media consumption on attitudes toward the
criminal justice system to “simultaneously consider the influence of respondent
characteristics,” (Rosenberger & Dierenfeldt, 2020, p. 8).
Second, cultivation research has predominately tested traditional media formats
such as television, print media, and radio. While the academic community recognizes that
profound transitions have been made in regard to media sources and consumption
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preferences, appropriation of new-age media venues in cultivation research has
admittedly been lethargic. Although new-age media sources represent some of the most
utilized venues of news information content, lagging just behind television (e.g.,
representing the second and fourth most consumed sources nationally; see Shearer,
2018), cultivation research has only recently transitioned to include these variables. To
provide a more robust approach toward contemporary media effects, this study will
utilize traditional and new-age media to gauge whether favorability toward the court
system is affected through consumption of the most commonly utilized media platforms.
Hypotheses
Traditionally, representations of the criminal justice system have been positive as
that the media has most commonly received its information from law enforcement
officials (Motschall & Cao, 2002). However, this trend appears to be less conclusive in
relation to the courts, as that what little scholarship exists on the matter contends that the
judicial arm of the criminal justice system is usually portrayed as slow, corrupt, and
arbitrary through the media lens (Baranauskas & Drakulich, 2018; Beckett & Sasson,
2004; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Jewkes, 2015). Given that the portrayals of the
judicial system are presented in such a negative fashion, it is anticipated that:
Hypothesis 1: Television and televised media consumption will be negatively
correlated with favorability toward the criminal courts.
Furthermore, scholarship contends that internet subject matter is likely too broad
to produce any cultivation effects in relation to internet media consumption and attitudes
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toward the criminal justice system (Intravia, Wolff, Paez, & Gibbs, 2017; Roche, Pickett,
& Gertz, 2016). Similarly, it is speculated that:
Hypothesis 2: Hours spent toward internet consumption will not be significantly
related to favorability toward the criminal courts.
Though research provides that there is no linear relationship between hours of
internet consumption and criminal justice (Intravia, et al., 2017), Intravia, Wolff, and
Piquero (2018) have suggested that consumption of social media platforms is associated
with positive attitudes toward law enforcement. Given that the judicial system is often
portrayed as a barrier toward effective policing within traditional media entertainment
(Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003), it is argued that if law enforcement is positively
related to social media consumption, then:
Hypothesis 3: Using social media as a daily new source will result in a negative
relationship with favorability toward the criminal courts.
Previous works have garnered that minority member perceptions are not affected
to the same degree as Whites by televised presentations of criminal justice (Eschholz, et
al., 2002; Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011). Consequently, the study predicts that:
Hypothesis 4: The association between media consumption and favorability
toward the criminal courts will be more significant for White consumers when the model
is disaggregated by race/ethnicity.
Subsequently, the study asserts that:
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Hypothesis 5: The association between media consumption and favorability
toward the criminal courts will be less significant among Black consumers when the
model is disaggregated by race/ethnicity.
Furthermore, it is expected that:
Hypothesis 6: The association between media consumption and favorability
toward the criminal courts will be less significant among Hispanic/Latino consumers
when the model is disaggregated by race/ethnicity.
Research contends that contemporary conservative and moderate news platforms
explicate the need to curb crime in a punitive manner more prevalently than their leftleaning counterparts (Mitchell, et al., 2014). However, scholarship contests that within
televised media, the criminal courts are often viewed as barriers between punitive
policing and crime control. Thus, the study contends that:
Hypothesis 7: Favorability toward the criminal courts will result in a negative
correlation between Republicans/Independents and media consumption when the model
is disaggregated by party affiliation.
Lastly, literature provides that liberal news programming more commonly
presents media stories which explicate the need to dispel excessive force and increase
civil liberties in contrast to conservative news outlets (Mitchell, et al., 2014). Given that
emphasis is often placed on adjudication rather than punitive force within these media
venues, it is hypothesized that:
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Hypothesis 8: Favorability toward the criminal courts will result in a positive
correlation between Democrats and media consumption when the model is disaggregated
by party affiliation.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODS
The study will utilize a dataset collected by the Survey Research Lab in the
Department of Sociology at Kent State University. The data is titled, “Attitudes toward
Crime, Courts, and Law Enforcement,” and consists of 1500 responses which includes an
oversample of non-white survey participants. From the respondents, 500 identified
themselves as White, 500 identified themselves as Black, and 500 identified themselves
as Hispanic/Latino. Survey questions are oriented toward consumer perceptions toward
the judicial system, the police, punitive attitudes, fear of crime, and victimization; as
well, the survey includes a battery of media exposure questions. Data collection was
conducted between March 21 and April 8, 2016. The survey used non-full probability
sampling from a national panel.
Participants for non-full probability sampling self-select themselves into a
potential response category through a survey vendor. Members of the potential response
category are contacted through email wherein the survey is conducted. This survey
approach resulted in a response rate of 48% and includes a sampling method that is not a
true random sample; however, research surmises that this approach produces data with
demographic characteristics similar to traditional approaches of fully random sampling
(Braunsberger, Wybenga, & Gates, 2007; Simmons & Bobo, 2015; Yeager, Krosnick,
Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & Wang, 2011).

35
Dependent variables
To explore whether media effects drive consumer perceptions toward the criminal
courts, this study includes the use of a single dependent variable. The survey question
asks respondents, “What is your favorability toward the criminal courts?” The dependent
variable utilizes a 10-point Likert scale where a respondent’s selection of 1 indicates that
they are “unfavorable” to the criminal courts, and a selection of 10 indicates that they are
“favorable” to the criminal courts.
Media variables
Previous cultivation studies have been admittedly limited in the scope of their
research due to a lack of contemporary media variables which have become exceedingly
prevalent within the context of society. This study includes traditional media variables
related to cultivation theory while simultaneously including new-age media platforms.
Thus, this study will include the following media variables: Crime Drama T.V.
consumption, Crime Reality T.V. consumption, Fox News, CNN News, Television
consumption, Facebook, Twitter, and Internet consumption.
“Crime Drama T.V.” consumption refers to the frequency of viewing dramatic
crime fiction shows such as American Crime Story, Breaking Bad, CSI, and NCIS.
“Crime Reality T.V.” consumption refers to the frequency of viewing realistic crime
shows such as Forensic Files, COPS, Unsolved Mysteries, and The First 48. “Crime
Drama T.V.” and “Crime Reality T.V.” are rated utilizing a 7-point Likert scale. A
selection of 1 indicates that the respondent never watches television shows of this genre;
a selection of 2 indicates consumption of less than once a month; a selection of 3
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indicates consumption of once a month; a selection of 4 indicates consumption of two or
three times a month; a selection of 5 indicates consumption of once a week; a selection of
6 indicates consumption of three to four times a week; lastly, a selection of 7 indicates
daily consumption of this media genre.
The variables “Television” and “Internet” each rate a respondent’s use of either
platform in hours per day. The “Television” variable asks respondents to gauge how
many hours per day the spend watching television. The “Internet” variable asks
respondents to gauge how many hours per day they spend on the internet. Fox News,
CNN News, Facebook, and Twitter are all dichotomous variables which are specifically
related to a respondent’s daily source of news media consumption. Each asks respondents
whether the platform in question is utilized as a daily news source. A selection of 0
indicates that the respondent does not utilize the variable as daily news source; a selection
of 1 indicates the use of the variable as the respondent’s daily news source.
Fear, crime, and victimization variables
Previous scholarship contests that direct experience with crime occurrence
(Dowler & Sparks, 2008), law enforcement (Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009), and
holding a high fear of crime (Dowler, 2003) affect cultivation parameters. Accounting for
these individual experiences, three variables which categorize fear of crime, experience
with crime and law enforcement, and victimization are present within this study. “Fear of
Crime” is measured using a 10-point Likert scale to assess the degree of fear a respondent
has toward the possibility of a crime event occurring. Responses range from ‘Not at all
Fearful’ (0) to ‘Very fearful’ (10).

37
Experience with law enforcement, labeled as “Arrest,” is a dichotomous variable
wherein respondents answer “No” (0) or “Yes” (1) as to whether the individual or a
member within the immediate household has ever been arrested. Fear of victimization,
labeled as “Victimization,” includes a combined six measures which assess respondents’
fear of victimization within their immediate neighborhood. The questions integrated into
the variable ask: 1. “How likely is it that a home in your neighborhood will be broken
into while the occupants are away?”; 2. “How likely is it that a home in your
neighborhood will be broken into while the occupants are at home?”; 3. “How likely is it
that someone in your neighborhood will be attacked by someone with a weapon?”; 4.
“How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will have their car stolen?”; 5.
“How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will be robbed or mugged?”; 6.
“How likely is it that property in your neighborhood will be vandalized?”. Each question
is measured used an eleven-item scale. An answer of “No” was recorded as 0; responses
range from 1 to 10 and indicate an increase in the respondent’s feelings toward the
likelihood of victimization. The total is then divided by ten to reflect the original
measure.
Control variables
Ample work suggests that socio-demographic factors impact an individual’s
attitude toward issues of criminal justice. Gender, age, race/ethnicity, education,
household income, and party affiliation have been argued to alter an individual’s
perception toward police, the criminal justice system, and crime and criminality. These
control variables are utilized within the regression.
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“Gender” has been coded as a dichotomous variable; 1 indicates the respondent is
a “Male” and 0 indicates the respondent is a “Female.” “Age” ranges from 18 to 92; 18
was the minimum allotted age to participate in the study. “Race” has been categorized
into dichotomous variables: “Black” (1 – 0), “Hispanic/Latino” (1 – 0), and “White” (1 –
0); a selection of 1 indicates that the respondent is a member of the prescribed race.
“Education” was measured using a 5-point gradation scale, where respondents could
select “Less than Highschool” (1) up to “Graduate of Professional Degree” (5).
“Household Income” was measured using a twelve-point gradation scale which ranged
from “Less than $15,000/Yearly” (1) to “Greater than $300,000/Yearly” (12). Party
affiliation was coded into three separate dichotomous variables and provided selections
of “Republican” (1 – 0), “Democrat” (1 – 0), and “Independent” (1 – 0); a selection of 1
indicates that the respondent is a member of the prescribed party.
Analytical approach
To establish whether news or entertainment media is significantly attributed to
favorability toward the criminal courts, Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression is
utilized. The study’s sample is then split across race/ethnicity to determine whether this
association differs across White, Black, and Hispanic/Latino respondents. Lastly, the
study’s sample is split across party affiliation to determine whether the association of
media and favorability toward the criminal courts differs across Republican, Democrat,
and Independent respondents. In order to appropriately compare across a split sample, the
comparison of regression coefficients (COC) test as described by Paternoster, Brame,

39
Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998)1 has been utilized. Paternoster’s cohort (1998) argued that
traditional Z-tests often favor rejection of the null hypothesis, thus leading to false
positives. The comparison of regression coefficients test is uncompromisingly stringent
and more adequately ensures the prevention of incorrect estimations.

1

Equality of Regression Coefficients Z = (b1 – b2)/√(SEb12 + SEb22)
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Of the sample, Table 1 shows approximately thirty-four percent of respondents
are White, thirty-three percent are Black, and thirty-three percent are Hispanic/Latino.
Democrats (61%) make up the majority of the sample’s political affiliation, while
Republicans (17.4%) and Independents (22%) present moderate figures. Favorability
toward the criminal courts is relatively high for the sample population (6.43 out of 10).
However, favorability toward the criminal courts varies significantly across race as Table
1.1 shows, where Whites (6.71) and Latinos (6.70) have considerably higher favorability
toward the courts than Blacks (5.87). Table 1.1 also provides that between parties,
Republicans (7.14) present the highest favorability toward the courts as compared to
Democrats (6.32) and Independents (6.41).
Of entertainment media, the population sample provides a mean of 3.82 in
relation to Crime Drama T.V. consumption. As a whole, the sample watches crime
dramas one to three times a month. The sample also provides a mean of 4.32 in relation
to Crime Reality T.V. consumption. In aggregate, the sample consumes crime reality
entertainment more often than crime drama television, watching crime reality between
two and three times a month, up to once a week. When the sample is split across race and
party affiliation, the mean of Crime Drama T.V. and Crime Reality T.V. is comparable to
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the aggregate sample, where Blacks (3.68), Latinos (3.79), and Republicans (3.80) watch
crime dramas more often than Democrats (3.65), but not as much as Whites (3.98) or
Independents (4.13). In relation to Crime Reality T.V. viewing, Blacks (4.14), Latinos
(4.29), and Democrats (4.18) consume crime reality shows similar to that of the aggregate
sample, while Whites (4.51) and Independents (4.67) consume this crime genre
considerably more often. Republicans (4.04) view crime reality programming less than
any other demographic.
Thirty-four percent of the aggregate sample indicated that Fox News was a daily
source of news information, with Whites (36%) and Latinos (36%) selecting that they
consume the program in higher proportions than Blacks (31%). CNN News showed to
house thirty-three percent of the aggregate sample as a daily news source, with Blacks
(37%) selecting the program more than Whites (30%) or Latinos (32%). The sample
indicated that on average, a respondent watches television 4.77 hours a day. When the
sample is split, Blacks (5.74) and Democrats (5.27) showed to consume television
considerably more than Whites (4.4), Latinos (4.24), Republicans (4.54), or Independents
(4.21).
In relation to new-age media platforms, forty-one percent of the sample indicated
the use of Facebook as a daily source of news information. Across race, Facebook was
selected more frequently by Latinos (44%) and Whites (41%) as compared to Blacks
(39%). Across party affiliation, Democrats (43%) and Republicans (41%) selected
Facebook as a daily source of news information more frequently than Independents
(37%). Only eighteen percent of the aggregate sample indicated Twitter as a source of
daily news. Blacks (19%) and Latinos (19%) showed to utilize Twitter more frequently
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than Whites (15%). Across party affiliation, Democrats (21%) utilize Twitter most
commonly versus Republicans (16%) and Independents (16%). The aggregate sampled
indicated daily Internet use to be 6.34 hours. Across race, Blacks (6.93) utilize internet
the most compared to Latinos (6.22) and Whites (5.91). Across party lines, Democrats
(6.51) and Independents (6.25) utilize the internet more often than Republicans (5.91).
Approximately forty-two percent of the sample is male. Across race,
approximately forty-eight percent of White respondents are male, thirty-nine percent of
Black respondents are male, and forty-five percent of Hispanic/Latino respondents are
male. Across parties, approximately forty-two percent of Democrats are male, fifty-one
percent of Republicans are male, and fifty percent of Independents are male. The mean
age of the sample is 44.64. Age varies greatly between race and party affiliation, with
Whites (48.35) being considerably older than Blacks (44.01) and Latinos (41.48); across
parties, Republicans (48.42) are noticeably older than Democrats (44.71) and
Independents (43.93).
The mean education of the sample is 3.35, indicating that respondents have an
education level between some college and college completion (undergraduate). The mean
does not widely vary across race or party affiliation, with Whites (3.31), Blacks (3.33),
and Latinos (3.41) holding comparable levels of education. Similarly, Democrats (3.36),
Republicans (3.41) and Independents (3.44) show to have comparable education levels.
The mean household income is 4.79, indicating that respondents make between
$35,000 and $60,000 yearly. When split, the sample yields small variations across
income, with Hispanics/Latinos (5.02) making more yearly than Whites (4.91) and
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Blacks (4.45). Republicans (5.38) make more than Democrats (4.73) or Independents
(4.70).
Table 1
Descriptive characteristics of the sample.
Variable

N = 1352

Description

Range

Mean

SD

Favorability toward the Criminal Courts

1 – 10

6.430

2.544

1–7

3.820

2.007

1–7

4.320

2.095

0–1

.340

.475

0–1

.330

.471

0 – 24

4.770

3.879

0–1

.410

.493

0–1

.180

.384

0 – 24

6.340

4.253

Dependent Variables
Criminal Courts

1 = Unfavorable…10 = Very Favorable
Media Variables
Crime Drama T.V.

Scale of viewing American Crime Story,
Breaking Bad, CSI, and NCIS.
1 = Never, 2 = < Once a month, 3 = Once a month,
4 = Two or three times a month, 5 = Once a week,
6 = Three to Four times a week, 7 = Daily

Crime Reality T.V.

Scale of viewing Forensic Files, COPS,
Unsolved Mysteries and The First 48.
1 = Never, 2 = < Once a month, 3 = Once a month,
4 = Two or three times a month, 5 = Once a week,
6 = Three to Four times a week, 7 = Daily

Fox News

Primary News Source
0 = No, 1 = Yes

CNN News

Primary News Source
0 = No, 1 = Yes

TV (Hours)

Consumption of TV in Hours
0 – 24 Hours/Day

Facebook

Primary News Source
0 = No, 1 = Yes

Twitter

Primary News Source
0 = No, 1 = Yes

Internet (Hours)

Consumption of internet in Hours
0 – 24 Hours/Day
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Table 1 (Continued)
Variable

Description

Range

Mean

SD

Gender

Male = 1, Female = 0

0–1

.424

.500

Age

Current Age of Respondent

18 – 92

44.640

16.077

Black

Black = 1, Other = 0

0–1

.331

.471

Latino

Latino = 1, Other = 0

0–1

.331

.471

White

White = 1, Other = 0

0–1

.337

.473

Education

1 = Less than Highschool, 2 = High School

1–5

3.350

1.007

1 – 12

4.790

2.388

Control Variables

Graduate, 3 = Some College, 4 = College
Graduate, 5 = Graduate or Professional Degree
Household Income

1 = < $14,999, 2 = $15-24,999, 3 = $25-34,999,
4 = $35-44,999, 5 = $45-59,999, 6 = $60-74,999,

7 = $75-99,999, 8 = $100-149000, 9 = $150-199,999,
10 = $200-249-999, 11 = $250-299,999, 12 = > $300,000.
Democrat

Democrat = 1,

Other = 0

0–1

.606

.500

Republican

Republican = 1,

Other = 0

0–1

.174

.379

Independent

Independent = 1, Other = 0

0–1

.220

.414

Fear that a crime will occur

0 – 10

3.200

2.776

0–1

.021

.144

0 – 10

2.066

1.583

Experiential Variables
Fear of Crime

0 = Not at all fearful… 10 = Very Fearful
Arrests in Household

Arrest of member in household

Victimization

Fear of Victimization in Locale
0 = No, 1-10 = Level of Crime Severity

Note: Abbreviation SD = Standard Deviation
From: “Attitudes Toward Crime, Courts, and Law Enforcement”— Social Research Lab, Kent State University; 2016

In aggregate, the sample produced a mean of 3.20 in relation to fear of crime,
indicating that respondents are not very fearful that crime will occur. The mean does not
vary widely when split, though Whites (2.8) show to have the lowest fear of crime
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compared to Blacks (3.3) and Latinos (3.5). Independents (2.86) are the least fearful of
party affiliation when compared to Republicans (3.23) and Democrats (3.7).
The sample presents that slightly more than two percent of respondents have been
arrested. Across race, Whites (3.2%) show to have been arrested the most compared to
Blacks (1.6%) and Latinos (1.6%). Across party lines, Republicans (1.7%) and
Democrats (1.6%) have been arrested the most while Independents (.09%) are the least
arrested of the demographic. The sample produced a mean of 2.066 in relation to fear of
victimization, with Whites (1.859) being less fearful of victimization than Blacks (2.192)
or Latinos (2.066). Democrats (2.202) are the most fearful of victimization among party
affiliations, while Republicans (1.936) and Independents (1.953) show to be slightly less
fearful of victimization within their locale.
Table 2 presents a series of OLS regressions testing the relationship between
selected media variables and favorability toward the criminal courts. Model 1 provides a
regression of the socio-demographic controls in relation to favorability toward the courts.
Perhaps unsurprising, the model provides that being “Black” (p. ≤ .001) is negatively
related to one’s favorability toward the criminal court system. Opposite the relation of
Blacks and the courts, “Education” (p. ≤ .001) shows to have a positive relationship with
favorability toward the court system. Similarly, claiming “Republican” as one’s party
affiliation shows to have a positive relationship with favorability toward the courts.
Model 2 regresses the socio-demographic controls and experiential variables.
When accounting for individual experiences with law enforcement, victimization, and
fear, the demographic variable “Black” slightly drops in significance while “Education”
and “Republican” variables remain constant. The experiential variable “Arrest” shows to
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be statistically significant in the sample; interestingly, individuals who have been arrested
present a positive relationship with favorability toward the criminal court system.
Table 1.1
Descriptive characteristics of the sample disaggregated by Race/Ethnicity and Party Affiliation.
Variable

Dependent Variables
Criminal Courts
Media Variables
Crime Drama T.V.
Crime Reality T.V.
Fox News
CNN News
Television (Hours)
Facebook
Twitter
Internet (Hours)
Control Variables
Gender
Age
Education
Household Income
Experiential Variables
Fear of Crime
Arrest
Victimization

White
Mean
(SD)

Black
Mean
(SD)

Latino
Mean
(SD)

Democrat
Mean
(SD)

Republican
Mean
(SD)

Independent
Mean
(SD)

6.710
(2.497)

5.870
(2.589)

6.700
(2.459)

6.320
(2.508)

7.140
(2.532)

6.410
(2.483)

3.980
(2.062)
4.510
(2.109)
.360
(.480)
.300
(.461)
4.360
(3.490)
.410
(.493)
.150
(.362)
5.910
(3.909)

3.680
(2.020)
4.140
(2.110)
.310
(.463)
.370
(.484)
5.740
(4.134)
.390
(.488)
.190
(.395)
6.930
(4.318)

3.790
(1.928)
4.290
(2.054)
.360
(.480)
.320
(.468)
4.240
(3.835)
.440
(.503)
.190
(.395)
6.220
(4.471)

3.650
(1.971)
4.180
(2.102)
.320
(.466)
.390
(.487)
5.270
(4.186)
.430
(.496)
.210
(.405)
6.510
(4.276)

3.800
(2.063)
4.040
(2.091)
.520
(.501)
.300
(.459)
4.540
(3.619)
.410
(.493)
.160
(.363)
5.910
(4.198)

4.130
(1.997)
4.670
(2.044)
.310
(.461)
.280
(.450)
4.210
(3.471)
.370
(.484)
.160
(.371)
6.250
(4.291)

.482
(.500)
48.350
(16.266)
3.310
(1.051)
4.910
(2.520)

.394
(.489)
44.010
(16.219)
3.330
(.964)
4.450
(2.308)

.447
(.497)
41.480
(14.970)
3.410
(1.004)
5.020
(2.292)

.420
(.494)
44.710
(16.086)
3.360
(.994)
4.730
(2.321)

.507
(.501)
48.420
(15.728)
3.410
(1.044)
5.380
(2.299)

.497
(.501)
43.930
(15.841)
3.440
(.990)
4.700
(2.536)

2.844
(2.704)
.032
(.175)
1.859
(1.516)

3.265
(2.805)
.016
(.126)
2.192
(1.673)

3.514
(2.782)
.016
(.152)
2.066
(1.543)

3.400
(2.874)
.026
(.160)
2.202
(1.649)

3.165
(2.761)
.031
(.172)
1.936
(1.573)

2.865
(2.515)
.009
(.095)
1.953
(1.422)

Note: Abbreviation SD = Standard Deviation
From: “Attitudes Toward Crime, Courts, and Law Enforcement”— Social Research Lab, Kent State University; 2016
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Model 3 regresses the socio-demographic controls and experiential variables with
media sources added to the model. Within the full model, the variable “Black” (p. ≤
.001) increases in significance while the variables “Education” and “Republican” remain
constant. The variable “Arrest” drops significance as media sources are added to the
model. There were no significant relationships found among media variables when the
sample population remains in aggregate.
Table 2
OLS regression of favorability toward the criminal courts.

N = 1352

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Control Variables

Control Variables

Control Variables

Male

.233 (.143)

Male

.267 (.150)

Male

.159 (.156)

Age

.006 (.005)

Age

.006 (.005)

Age

.007 (.005)

Black

-.620 (.179)***

Black

-.568 (.189)**

Black

-.683 (.198)***

Latino

.076 (.164)

Latino

.110 (.181)

Latino

.088 (.186)

Education

.256 (.076)***

Education

.309 (.079)***

Education

.313 (.083)***

Income

-.030 (.034)

Income

-.047 (.035)

Republican

.556 (.194)**

Republican

.531 (.203)**

Income
Republican
Constant
2

R

-.002 (.032)
.559 (.189)**
5.307***
.044

Experiential Variables

Experiential Variables

Fear

Fear

.027 (.040)

Arrest

1.121 (.481)*

Arrest

.473 (.558)

Victim

-.009 (.007)

Victim

-.011 (.007)

Constant
R2

5.361***
.054

Media Variables
Crime Drama

.077 (.047)

Crime Reality

.038 (.046)

Fox News

.259 (.167)

CNN News

.283 (.169)

T.V. (Hours)

.014 (.024)

Facebook

-.025 (.171)

Twitter

.342 (.212)

Internet

-.003 (.021)

Constant
2

R
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses.

-.001 (.042)

5.659***
.073

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 ; ***p ≤ 0.001
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Table 3
OLS Regression of favorability toward the criminal courts disaggregated by Race/Ethnicity.
Paternoster’s et al., (1998) comparison of regression coefficients is included within the model.
N = 1352

White ( n = 459)

W vs. B

Black (n = 444)

B vs. L

Latino (n = 449)

W vs. L

Paternoster’s et al., (1998) COC Test (One-Tailed: Z = 1.645)

Control Variables
Male

-.303 (.250)

-1.594

.322 (.302)

0.662

.440 (.267)

-2.031

Age

.008 (.009)

-0.074

. 009 (.010)

0.707

.011 (.010)

-0.223

Education

.179 (.128)

-1.255

.442 (.166)**

0.645

.286 (.140)*

-0.564

Income

.066 (.051)

1.120

-.031 (.070)

0.663

-.233 (.062)***

3.724

Republican

.163 (.267)

-1.500

1.343 (.740)

0.400

.532 (.322)

-0.088

Experiential Variables
Fear

.104 (.071)

1.569

-.058 (.075)

0.687

-.034 (.071)

1.374

Arrest

-.332 (.800)

-1.108

1.123 (1.042)

0.624

1.211 (1.119)

-1.122

Victim

-.032 (.012)**

-1.187

-.011 (.013)

0.707

.009 (.013)

-2.317

.081 (.074)

0.929

.190 (.091)*

0.660

.044 (.080)

1.147

Crime Reality T.V. .146 (.075)*

1.968

-.083 (.089)

-0.630

.006 (.074)

1.442

Fox News

.635 (.271)**

1.755

-.097 (.317)

0.658

.247 (.277)

1.001

CNN News

.320 (.275)

-0.063

.582 (.311)

0.677

-.063 (.286)

0.965

Television (Hours) -.013 (.043)

-0.526

.019 (.043)

0.690

.031 (.041)

-0.740

Facebook

-.775 (.279)** -1.243

-.238 (.330)

0.646

.837 (.279)**

-4.086

Twitter

1.011 (.376)**

1.645

.131 (.381)

0.669

-.006 (.343)

1.998

Internet (Hours)

-.062 (.034)

-2.258

.060 (.042)

0.648

.025 (.034)

-1.809

Media Variables
Crime Drama T.V.

Constant

7.003***

R2

.151

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
Note: W = White; B = Black; L = Latino

4.087***
.102

5.128***
.095
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

Table 3 displays the results of an OLS regression testing the association between
selected media variables and favorability toward the criminal courts across race/ethnicity.
Between each column display are the results of Paternoster’s et al., (1998) comparison of
regression coefficients test. An emboldened Z-score represents a statistically significant
variance across race/ethnicity. Only the results found significant by the comparison of
regression coefficients test are explained, as that failure to reach the base one-tailed score
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(Z = 1.645) between race/ethnicity demographics indicates that there are no significant
differences across the split sample.
Of the control variables, high earning Hispanics/Latinos have a significantly
stronger negative association toward the criminal courts when compared to Whites (p. ≤
.001; Z = 3.724). This was the only statistically significant control variable presented
across race/ethnicity as that the comparison of regression coefficients test found no
significant differences across “Black Education” or “Hispanic/Latino Education” when
comparing across split sample. Of the experiential variables, White victims of crime
showed to have a significantly stronger negative association toward the criminal courts
when compared to Hispanic/Latino victims of crime (b = -.032; Z = -2.317).
Racial and ethnic differences were substantial when looking at the association
between media consumption and favorability toward the criminal courts. Watching
“Crime Reality T.V.” is positively associated to favorability toward the criminal courts
for White viewers when compared to Black viewers of crime reality shows. Using “Fox
News” as a source of daily news is also positively associated to favorability toward the
courts for Whites when compared to Blacks. Using “Facebook” as a daily news source
presented a very strong association between White and Hispanic/Latino users (Z = 4.086). For Whites, Facebook resulted in a negative association with favorability toward
the criminal courts; Facebook use for Latinos, however, resulted in a positive association
with the criminal courts. When used as a daily source of news for Whites, Twitter
presented a significant positive association toward the criminal courts when compared to
Black and Hispanic/Latino Twitter users.
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Table 4 displays the results of an OLS regression testing the association between
media variables and favorability toward the criminal courts across political party
affiliation. Between each column display are the results of Paternoster’s et al., (1998)
comparison of regression coefficients test. An emboldened Z-score represents a
statistically significant variance across party affiliation. Only the results found significant
by the comparison of regression coefficients test are explained, as that failure to reach the
base one-tailed score (Z = 1.645) between party demographics indicates that there are no
significant differences across the split sample.
Of the socio-demographic controls, Black Democrats showed to have a
significantly stronger negative relationship toward the courts versus Black Republicans
(p. ≤ .001; Z = 2.224) and Black Independents (p. ≤ .001; Z = -2.234). Hispanic/Latino
Independents presented a positive relationship toward the criminal courts when compared
to Hispanic/Latino Democrats and Hispanic/Latino Republicans. “Education” among
Democrats failed to meet statistical variance across the split sample when the comparison
of regression coefficients test was applied. In relation to the experiential variables,
Republicans presented a positive relationship between the criminal courts and “Fear of
Crime” compared to both Democrats and Independents. Of the selected media variables,
only “Internet” presented a significant relationship between party affiliation and the
criminal courts. More hours spent on the internet presented a negative relationship
between Republicans and the criminal courts when compared to Democrats and
Independents.
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Table 4
OLS Regression of favorability toward the criminal courts disaggregated by party affiliation.
Paternoster’s et al., (1998) comparison of regression coefficients is included within the model.
N = 1233

Republican (246)

R vs. D

Democrat (697)

D vs. I

Independent (290)

R vs. I

Paternoster’s et al., (1998) COC Test (One-Tailed: Z = 1.645)

Control Variables
Male

.263 (.364)

0.532

.175 (.215)

0.675

-.109 (.362)

0.725

Age

-.002 (.013)

-0.745

.009 (.007)

0.007

.009 (.013)

-0.598

Black

.531 (.745)

2.224

-2.234

.111 (.537)

0.457

Latino

- .095 (.367)

0.658

-.404 (.293)

-2.587

.889 (.405)*

-1.800

Education

.182 (.178)

-0.297

.245 (.116)*

0.314

.170 (.209)

0.044

Income

-.005 (.079)

0.404

-.043 (.051)

0.882

-.123 (.075)

0.002

2.328

-.066 (.057)

0.244

-.096 (.109)

2.023

-.769 (1.191)

-1.175

.862 (.714)

1.307

-1.738 (1.857)

0.439

-.024 (.018)

-1.068

.002 (.010)

0.047

-.003 (.019)

-0.802

.024 (.104)

0.485

.084 (.067)

0.057

.013 (.105)

0.074

Crime Reality T.V. .009 (.103)

0.531

.074 (.066)

-1.693

-.136 (.105)

0.986

-1.230 (.268)***

Experiential Variables
Fear
Arrest
Victimization

.206 (.102)*

Media Variables
Crime Drama T.V.

Fox News

.100 (.367)

-0.424

.286 (.241)

-0.333

.434 (.373)

-0.638

CNN News

-.006 (.397)

-0.893

.377 (.225)

0.358

.218 (.399)

-0.397

Television (Hours)

.005 (.056)

-0.338

.027 (.033)

0.655

-.019 (.062)

0.287

Facebook

.631 (.381)

1.493

-.043 (.242)

0.577

-.430 (.394)

1.936

Twitter

.188 (.547)

-0.116

.259 (.277)

0.017

.571 (.511)

-0.512

Internet (Hours)

-.099 (.046)*

-1.875

.005 (.031)

2.415

.035 (.049)

1.994

Constant
R2

7.746***
.089

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses.
Note: R = Republican; D = Democrat; I = Independent

6.291***
.091

5.291***
.077
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
Several general limitations within existing cultivation literature have been
overcome within the current study. First, utilizing data which oversampled Blacks and
Hispanics/Latinos provided for an in-depth comparison across race/ethnicity. This form
of research is seldom undertaken within the realm of media studies, primarily due to the
inherent limitations of nationally representative data sets. This study is also one of very
few to encapsulate both traditional and new-age media measures to assess the role of
cultivation and consumer perceptions toward the criminal courts. Additionally, the study
entailed represents the only known work to explain the relationship between the
cultivation of viewer attitudes and the criminal court system, and the first to evaluate this
association across race/ethnicity.
As well, this research also included comparisons across political party affiliation,
an important demographic control to incorporate when considering individual perceptions
between the court system and media influence (see Johnston & Bartels, 2010; Roche,
Pickett, & Gertz, 2016). Dissimilar to Johnston White and Bartels (2010), this work finds
that there are statistical differences between Republicans and Democrats/Independents in
their perceptions of the courts when analyzed in the aggregate sample (Democrats and
Independents were the excluded groups). When selected as the mediating variable
however, party affiliation showed little difference between favorability toward the
criminal courts and media exposure, with the exception of internet use.
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The results suggest that Hypothesis 1 is simply not supported. Analysis from the
aggregate sample found no statistical relationships between television or televised media
consumption and the dependent variable. This is not surprising however, as that media
presentations of crime tend to have a greater impact on White viewers than minority
members (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011; Dowler & Zawilski, 2007; Eschholz et al.,
2002; Rosenberger & Dierenfeldt, 2020). As that there is an oversample of Black and
Hispanic/Latino respondents, White consumer cultivation within the aggregate sample
has been handily suppressed.
When the sample is split across race however, televised media consumption is
positively related to consumer favorability toward the courts. This finding is specifically
present among White media consumers, where “Crime Reality T.V.” and “Fox News”
consumption resulted in higher levels of favorability toward the criminal courts in
relation to Black consumers. Some scholars have argued that crime reality programming
(such as Forensic Files, Cold Case Files, The First 48, Unsolved Mysteries, and COPS)
incorporates aspects of perceived realism in comparison to other forms of crime-related
programs, thus influencing audience perceptions of crime and criminal justice to a greater
degree (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2015; Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Potter, 1986; Surette,
2007)
In contrast to traditional media portrayals of an often corrupt and lethargic judicial
system as described within the literature review, the study suggests that televised media
exposure leads to positive evaluations of the criminal courts. This is particularly the case
for White Fox News consumers, wherein positive evaluations of the criminal courts are
strongly associated with the media variable when compared to Blacks (b = .635; Z =
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1.755). As that Rosenberger and Dierenfeldt (2020, p. 18) suggest, “[Fox News] is known
for an extremely punitive and pro-policing approach to the criminal justice system.”
Thus, it is entirely plausible that positively presented depictions of a punitive criminal
justice system subsequently promulgate positive evaluations toward the criminal courts.
With the exception of Republican internet use, the results provide support for
Hypothesis 2, as hours spent toward internet consumption were not significantly related
with favorability toward the criminal courts in the aggregate sample or when split across
race. These findings remain in line with previous scholarship (see Intravia, Wolff, &
Piquero, 2017; Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004); thus, cultivation
theory may not be entirely supported in the context of internet exposure, or simply “the
internet may be related to the public’s opinions on crime and justice in different ways
than traditional media outlets” (Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016, p. 232). As well, scholars
largely recognize the sublimity that is the internet; the messages an internet consumer is
exposed to are widely varying and without precise message-oriented internet media
questions, it appears difficult to quantify any connection between the internet consumer
and crime-related messages. The current study found a significant negative relationship
between internet use and favorability toward the criminal courts among Republicans
when the sample was split across party affiliation. Theoretically, two primary causes
assist to explicate this finding, as detailed below.
First, as reasoned within their study, Roche, Pickett, & Gertz (2016, p. 227) stated
that when comparing subsamples of the population, “given the number of models
estimated, one would expect to identify some statistically significant relationships simply
by chance.” However, it is entirely possible that heavy internet use among Republicans
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reduces favorability toward the criminal court system. Second, based on their overview of
the differential reception thesis (Carragee, 1990; Eschholz, et al., 2003; Fiske, 1986;
Gunter, 1987; Perse, Ferguson, & McLeod, 1994), Roche, Pickett, & Gertz (2016) argue
that consistent media messages may impact certain subgroups of respondents differently
in relation to others, stating that “media messages [may have] dissimilar effects on
persons depending on their backgrounds, experiences, and social environments” (p. 226).
Given this, due to distinct ideologies largely shared among political subgroups, it is
possible that consistently portrayed messages on the internet may have a compounding
effect. Confoundingly, Roche, Pickett, & Gertz (2016) find similar, though
inconsequential, statistical findings in their own work in relation to media exposure and
political affiliation, thus the researchers argue for an expansion of differential reception
research based upon an “ideology hypothesis” (p. 231) which may assist to “suggest that
political ideology may be the primary audience trait that moderates the relationship
between Internet news and attitudes [toward the criminal justice system]” (p. 231).
Furthermore, stories of police misconduct or wrongdoing are circulated heavily
throughout the internet. The significant relationship of Republicans and heavy internet
use may be associated with an increased awareness of especially high-profile reports of
police brutality. Traditional media presentations of police wrongdoing have been
associated with negative attitudes toward law enforcement (Jefferis, Kaminski, Holmes,
& Hanley, 1997; Lasley, 1994; Weitzer, 2002). With this knowledge, it appears
reasonable to theorize that heavy circulation of improper policing throughout the internet
may result in negative attitudes toward the criminal justice system, thus reducing
favorability toward the criminal courts as a reverberating effect. Moreover, as that
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Republicans (7.746) hold the highest favorability toward the criminal courts as compared
to Democrats and Independents when all independent variables are accounted for, it
seems prescient that such high favorability would be reduced from the portrayals of
police misconduct in circulation on the internet.
The findings of the study suggest that Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. The
models indicate that consumption of Facebook as a daily source of news is negatively
associated with White consumers and positively associated with Hispanic/Latino
consumers when compared utilizing Paternoster’s et al., (1998) comparison of regression
coefficients test. Even when controlling for political ideology, which gratuitously affects
news and advertisement selections for consumers on social media platforms (Bakshy,
Messing, & Adamic, 2015), the relationship still exists across the split sample.
Furthermore, Twitter shows to be positively associated with White consumers when
compared with Blacks and Hispanics/Latinos; a similarly intriguing finding given that
political ideology has been controlled for within the model.
A positive association between social media and the criminal courts is not entirely
surprising, however. Intravia, Wolff, and Piquero (2018) found that heavy social media
use increases consumer confidence in law enforcement officials. With this
understanding—tangent to the theoretical interpretation garnered in relation to the
positive relationship found between White consumers and Fox News programming—a
positive association between media exposure and the criminal courts may “reflect a
general positivity toward the police in the types of news circulated on [social media]”
(Rosenberger & Dierenfeldt, 2020 p. 19); that is, media messages which increase police
perceptions among a consuming audience may have similar effects toward the courts.
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Subsequent of differential reception research, scholars within the field of
communication and mass media communications have long recognized “that [media
consumers] are subjects as well as objects and that they actively participate in the
construction of meaning of [media] messages” (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003, p.
396). Within this subset of communication research, social scientists have brought about
four widely researched hypotheses which have been developed to explain “audience traits
or circumstances that could inform the relationship between [media] and [the dependent
variable]” (p. 396). The differential reception hypothesis includes: substitution,
resonance, vulnerability, and affinity.
In association with differential reception research, the vulnerability hypothesis as
expanded upon by Skogan and Maxfield (1981), contends that “[certain individuals]
would be more responsive to media messages about crime, in part because of their
presumed greater vulnerability to the possibility of victimization. In effect, the
vulnerability position seems to argue that vulnerability leads to fear, which increases
one’s attentiveness to media representations of crime” (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz,
2003, p. 397). In this study, a significant negative relationship was found for Whites who
consume Facebook as a daily news source (b = -.774; p. ≤ .01) when compared against
Hispanic/Latinos but not Blacks. This may be due, in part, to the use of Facebook as a
platform for protestation among millions of Black Americans seeking racial equality and
increased civil liberties under the banner of Black Lives Matter (BLM).
Resultant of Facebook’s use as a public forum for protestation and Black
collaboration, White Facebook consumers may have felt vulnerable during periods of
high insurrection and increased police/protestor violence. From 2013 to 2016, tens of
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thousands of protests occurred, with 2016 experiencing the largest number of BLM
protests, and violent riots, to date (Turan, 2021). Frequent protestation was subsequent
from police killings of unarmed Black men and women such as Eric Garner, Michael
Brown, Darren Wilson, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, Meagan Hockaday, Deborah Danner,
and Alton Sterling. Subsequent public access to Facebook’s livestream platform, millions
of consumers were given the opportunity to watch large-scale Black protests in
Baltimore, Maryland following the police killing of Freddie Gray, and in Oxnard,
California, following the police killing of Meagan Hockaday (Davis, 2016). Later in July
of 2016, Facebook Live was used to video the murder of Philando Castile, an unarmed
Black man shot by Minnesota Police Officer, Jeronimo Yanez while Castile’s four-yearold daughter and fiancée, Diamond Reynolds were in the vehicle.
While Blacks have been historically accustomed to vulnerability within the
United States, White Facebook consumers may have felt unusually vulnerable during
periods of mass protestation, leading to a reduction in their evaluations of the courts due
to external pressures that weigh on their sense of moral permanence within the criminal
justice system. Brought about from widespread unrest and civil disobedience as
consistently portrayed within Facebook news media, White consumers may have been
dissimilarly affected as compared to Blacks and Hispanics/Latinos within the consuming
populace (Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Gerbner, et al., 1980; Roche, Pickett, &
Gertz, 2016). Indeed, White media consumers likely experience divergent effects when
consuming media messages consistent among all audiences (Callanan, 2012; Callanan &
Rosenberger, 2011; Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997; Eschholz, 1997; Eschholz,
Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003).
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Moving forward, this study’s research provides insights toward media effects on
race congruent with previous literature (Eschholz, et al., 2002; Eschholz, Chiricos, &
Gertz, 2003), that Whites are affected by the media to a higher degree than other
race/ethnicity demographics. In support of Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6, the model presents that
White evaluations toward the criminal courts are influenced significantly more through
media presentations than are Black or Hispanic/Latino evaluations of the court system.
Eschholz, Chiricos, and Gertz (2003) argue that White evaluations of criminal justice
may be more enriched through media presentations because the demographic largely
lacks direct experience with the criminal justice system. As a response to the lack of realworld experience, White media consumers form indirect understandings of the criminal
justice system through the media lens, and thus uptake evaluations toward the criminal
courts in relation to media presentations of punitive law enforcement.
Polarized reasoning can be stated for the lack of significant findings between
minority members and media presentations toward the criminal justice system. Minority
members have been argued to have more direct experience with law enforcement and
criminal justice (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011), and thus are not influenced by media
presentations to the same degree as Whites. In fact, this study found no statistically
significant findings among Black media consumers when compared across the split
sample using Paternoster’s et al., (1998) coefficients test. Unsurprisingly, Blacks may
hold significantly different evaluations of crime through the media lens as compared to
Whites (Dowler & Zawilski, 2007; Eschholz, et al., 2002; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz,
2003; Gerbner, et al., 1980; Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016).

60
Further, scholars recognize that traditional media presentations of crime do little
to affect minority groups as that they are more likely to have direct experience with law
enforcement and are thus more likely to maintain negative opinions about the criminal
justice system (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011; Eschholz, et al., 2002). Subsequent of
such direct experiences, this study’s lack of findings among minority members may be
indicative of their poor opinions toward the criminal justice system. Known as the ‘floor
effect’ (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011; Eschholz, et al., 2002), scholars hypothesize that
“the media do not have any effect on [minority] viewers’ attitudes because their opinions
of the [criminal justice system] are extremely low” (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2001, p.
182).
Still, the study did present significant findings related to Hispanic/Latino
respondents in relation to new-age media platforms. Though, across traditional media
venues there were no significant effects. Such a finding between Hispanic/Latino
respondents’ evaluations of the criminal courts and Facebook is somewhat unsurprising,
however, as that nearly 75% of Hispanic/Latino Americans utilize social media platforms
as a daily source of news (Pew, 2018). Given that social media news feed algorithms
greatly affect which topics certain demographics consume (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic,
2015), it is reasonable to predict that, even when political affiliation is accounted for
within the model, homogenizing ideology-driven information is consistently displayed
among the Hispanic/Latino audience, thus driving evaluations toward a certain issue, e.g.,
the criminal courts.
Finally, the study’s findings provide that Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 largely
remain in question. Few significant results were found when the sample was split across

61
party affiliation among any media venue; however, some interesting insights remain to be
discussed. First, the only statistically significant finding to result from the disaggregation
of party affiliation was Republican use of the internet, rated in hours. Tangent to the
argument made from Roche, Pickett, and Gertz’s (2016) analyses, this finding may
indicate that party affiliation acts as a moderating variable between the individual and
internet media exposure. Thus, party affiliation may dictate the consumer’s “choice of
websites, their selection of content on those sites, and their reception and retention of
criminal justice information from that content” (p. 231).
Second, while failing to meet the prescribed standard of statistical significance (p
≤ .05), valuable insights were made toward new-age media consumption and the courts
when party affiliation acted as the mediating variable. Specifically, Republican use of
Facebook as a daily news source was nearing statistical significance within the model (p.
≤ .09) and is shown to be statistically different in comparison to Independents (Z = 1.936)
and nearly approaches statistical significance compared to Democrats (Z = 1.493) when
Paternoster’s et al., (1998) comparison of regression coefficients test is utilized. A
limitation of the study, these findings point toward the need to specifically ask
“respondents specific content-related questions regarding media usage (i.e., how much
respondents are exposed to stories and news reports about [criminal justice])” (Intravia,
Wolff, & Piquero, 2018, p. 977), rather than soliciting time spent consuming online
content or simply promulgating social media news platforms into dichotomous variables.
Despite its contribution to cultivation literature, the current study suffers from
limitations that oblige discussion. First, the dependent variable, “How favorable are you
toward the criminal courts?” is very broad. The measure provides no indication to how
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participants should answer the question in relation to their personal or political
proclivities. While it was found that respondent favorability toward the criminal courts
was positively associated with Fox News, a network known for its extremely punitive
approach to criminal justice (see Mills, 2017), it is theoretically plausible that
respondents with opposing viewpoints would solicit similar responses to the dependent
variable. Simply, respondents consuming conservative media sources could feel strongly
toward the criminal courts as that they believe them to be in line with punitive criminal
justice; on the other hand, some respondents who consume progressive forms of media
may feel strongly toward the criminal courts as that they believe them to be in line with
ideals of rehabilitation and lenience (Mitchell, et al., 2016). In short, the dependent
variable lacks a qualifying marker (e.g., “How favorable are you toward punitive criminal
courts?”) that would assist respondents to gauge their evaluations of the courts more
appropriately. This appears to be a legitimate discrepancy within the study, as that based
on previous literature of the penal system, scholarship suggests that a positive linear
relationship exists between punitive criminal justice preferences and media exposure
(Rosenberger & Callanan, 2011).
Furthermore, the measure utilized to test internet consumption on favorability
toward the criminal courts is too broad. Within the study, internet consumption is
measured as the number of hours respondents spend online per day. As a result, the
variable provides neither an explication of how respondents are spending their time on
the internet nor gives insight into what content they choose to consume. Though previous
literature has found a relationship between television consumption measured in hours per
day and perceptions toward the criminal justice system, the internet may be too
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substantial to cultivate homogenizing preferences among internet consumers. While
television content is produced by a small number of media organizations (Cooper, 2005),
the internet remains a largely decentralized platform wherein consumers have immense
autonomy to select an unlimited number of resources to peruse.
In addition, though the data utilized in this study is unique due to an oversample
of minority respondents that allowed for comparisons across race/ethnicity, it is not a
nationally representative sample. Thus, the findings within the study cannot be
generalized among the population at large. Future research in relation to evaluations
toward aspects of the American court system would benefit from nationally
representative data.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The limitations notwithstanding, the results from the current study highlight that
in contrast to the ways in which traditional media venues historically depict the
judiciary—a corrupt appendage of the criminal justice system which provides undue safe
haven to ruthless criminals and acts as a barrier to effective policing—televised media
presentations of crime and criminal justice show to have an overall positive association
with individual evaluations toward the criminal courts. As well, new-age media platforms
present similar findings, providing that perceptions toward the courts are largely positive
among consumers using Facebook and Twitter as daily news sources. Though an
exception to this finding exists among White Facebook consumers, it seems plausible that
this anomaly acts as a statistical snapshot in time; a quantitative insight into a tumultuous
and long overdue turning point in the history of the United States which subsequently
spurred immense feelings of vulnerability within the White community, a demographic
that otherwise shows to have positive evaluations of the criminal courts.
Moreover, the current study further solidifies the way that race/ethnicity mediates
the association between media and the criminal justice system. The findings suggest that
certain media venues, specifically Crime Reality T.V., Fox News, Facebook, and Twitter,
are associated with evaluations toward the criminal courts differently when split across
racial divides. Within this work, it is found that Whites are more likely to be affected by
these venues when compared to minority respondents. Indeed, this finding underscores
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the imperative for research to continue assessing media consumption and perceptions of
the criminal justice system that includes the preponderance of racial/ethnic characteristics
within the sample.
Finally, the study finds that internet consumption is negatively associated with
favorability toward the criminal courts among Republicans when the sample is split
across party affiliation. As well, marginal support is found among Republicans’ use of
Facebook even when compared against Independent Facebook consumers. This suggests
that new-age media platforms may be cultivating homogenous preferences among
consumers and that political ideology moderates this perceived relationship. If so, further
exploration and an expansion of the differential reception hypothesis may be needed to
account for these plausible occurrences.
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APPENDIX A.
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Items from the 2016 Center for Social Research Lab; Kent State University
Favorability toward the Criminal Courts

Dependent Variables:
COURT1: “On a scale from 1 – 10, with 1 being unfavorable and 10 being favorable,
how favorable are you toward the criminal courts?”
1. Unfavorable
2.
3.
4.
5. Somewhat Favorable
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. Favorable

Media Variables:
Media 9, Crime Drama Television:
“How often do you consume crime dramas like American Crime Story, Better Call Saul,
Breaking Bad, Orange is the New Black, Criminal Minds, NCIS, CSI, and Law and
Order: SVU?”
1. Never
2. Less than once a month.
3. Once a month.
4. Two or three times a month.
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5. Once or twice a week.
6. Three to four times a week.
7. Daily
Media 8, Crime Reality Television:
“How often do you consume crime-reality television shows like Forensic Files, Cold
Case Files, The First 48, Unsolved Mysteries, and COPS?”
1. Never
2. Less than once a month
3. Once a month
4. Two or three times a month.
5. Once or twice a week
6. Three to four times a week.
7. Daily

MEDIA 10_1, Fox News:
“Which of the following do you watch as a source of daily news? (select all that apply)”
1. Yes, Respondent selected this response
2. No, Respondent did not select this response.

MEDIA 10_2, CNN News:
“Which of the following do you watch as a source of daily news? (select all that apply)”
1. Yes, Respondent selected this response
2. No, Respondent did not select this response.

Media 7_3, Facebook:
“Which of the following do you watch as a source of daily news? (select all that apply)”
1. Yes, Respondent selected this response
2. No, Respondent did not select this response.
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Media 7_6, Twitter:
“Which of the following do you watch as a source of daily news? (select all that apply)”
1. Yes, Respondent selected this response
2. No, Respondent did not select this response.

MEDIA 2, Television:
“On an average day, how many hours do you watch T.V.?”
Number of Hours ______.

MEDIA 1, Internet:
“On an average day, how many hours do you spend on the internet?”
Number of Hours ______.

Demographic, Ideology, and Individual Experience Variables:
GENDER: “What is your gender?”
0. Female
1. Male
2. Other
AGE: “Are you 18 years of age or older?” “What is your age in years?”
Please state your age _____.

RACE: “What race do you consider yourself to be?
1. White
2. Black/African American
3. Hispanic/Latino
Respondent answers were separated into dichotomous variables.

EDUC, Education: “Which of the following best describes your education?”
1. Less than High School
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2. High School Graduate
3. Some College or Technical School
4. College Graduate
5. Graduate or Professional Degree

HINC, Household Income: “Below are some income categories. Please choose the
category that best describes the total annual income of the household. Please include
your personal income, as well as the income of others living in the household.”
1. Less than $14,999.
2. Between $15,000 and $24,999.
3. Between $25,000 and $34,999.
4. Between $35,000 and $44,999.
5. Between $45,000 and $59,999.
6. Between $60,000 and $74,999.
7. Between $75,000 and $99,999.
8. Between $100,000 and $149,999.
9. Between $150,000 and $199,999.
10. Between $200,000 and $249,999.
11. Between $250,000 and $299,999.
12.Above $300,000.

VOTE6: “What is your Party Affiliation?”
1. Democrat
2. Republican
3. Independent
4. Other: Please Specify _____.
Respondent answers were separated into dichotomous variables.

Fear of Crime:
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“For the next set of questions, please rate how fearful you are that certain crimes will
happen to you. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 equals not at all fearful and 10 equals
very fearful…”
FER_1

How fearful are you that your home will be broken into while you are
away?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_2

How fearful are you that your home will be broken into while you are at
home?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_3

How fearful are you that you will be attacked by someone with a weapon?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_4

How fearful are you that you will be raped or sexually assaulted?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_5

How fearful are you that your car will be stolen?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_6

How fearful are you that you will be robbed or mugged?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_7

How fearful are you that your property will be vandalized?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

FER_8

How fearful are you for the safety of your loved ones (i.e. spouse, partner,
children, or other family members)?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

Arrest:
“Have you ever been arrested by the police?”
1. Yes
2. No.
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8. Don’t Know
9. No Answer

Victimization:
“The next questions ask you about how you feel about crime in your neighborhood.
Using a scale of one to ten, where one equals not at all likely and ten equals very likely,
please rate the likelihood that the crime will happen in your neighborhood.”
[QUESTIONS FOR VIC_1 TO VIC_7 ARE ASKED IN RANDOM ORDER]
VIC_1

How likely is it that a home in your neighborhood will be broken into
while the occupants are away?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_2

How likely is it that a home in your neighborhood will be broken into
while the occupants are at home?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_3

How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will be attacked by
someone with a weapon?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_4

How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will be raped or
sexually assaulted?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_5
stolen?

How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will have their car
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_6

How likely is it that someone in your neighborhood will be robbed or
mugged?
98. Don’t know
99. No Answer

VIC_7

How likely is it that property in your neighborhood will be vandalized?
98. Don’t know

No Answer
End.
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